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Cornhusker Economics
The Potential for Moral Hazard Behavior
in Irrigation Decisions under Crop Insurance
Background: The Federal Crop Insurance Corporation provides one of the most widely adopted risk mitigation tools
used by crop producers across the United States. In 2018,
over 90% of corn and soybean acres were insured in most
of the Great Plains and Midwestern United States (Farm
Bureau, 2019). As with all insurance, there are questions of
whether moral hazard behavior occurs with insurance enrollment. In economics, moral hazard refers to cases where
someone makes riskier decisions when he or she is protected from the full cost of doing so. For example, someone
with fire insurance on their home may be less careful about
checking and replacing smoke alarms than someone without fire insurance. With crop insurance, moral hazard occurs if a producer makes riskier operating decisions because of the loss protection provided by insurance.
In a recent project, we combined information about the
federal crop insurance program with parameterized cropwater production function information to determine if
there is an incentive for moral hazard in irrigation decisions under crop insurance. A naïve approach suggests that
a producer would deliberately reduce irrigation with crop
insurance since he can save the cost of irrigation and receive an indemnity for lost revenue. However, this naïve
statement ignores many of the realities of the crop insurance program. Recent work (Mieno et al., 2018) suggests
that when the dynamics of crop insurance are incorporated, moral hazard may either decrease or increase input
use since the benefits of higher yield accrue for multiple
years. In our work, we asked the following questions: 1) Is
there an economic incentive to change irrigation management under crop insurance when realistic features of the
crop insurance program are included?, and 2) How does
the economic incentive change if important features of
crop insurance program design are modified?

We used simulation analysis with realistic parameters
from the existing crop insurance program, agronomic
crop-water production function information, historical weather conditions, and current prices to determine if there is an incentive to change irrigation use
under crop insurance (relative to the no-insurance
case). Our results showed that under the existing crop
insurance policy design with current input and output
prices, there is no incentive to adjust irrigation use,
and optimal irrigation use is the same with or without
crop insurance. We also found that if irrigation costs
increase significantly, it may become financially beneficial to reduce irrigation application.
Our analysis accounts explicitly for the fact that insurance premiums and benefits are a function of Actual
Production History (APH). In its simplest form, APH
is an average of the 10 most recent yields in one’s
cropping history. Since input use affects APH for the
next 10 years, the use of production history introduces
temporal dynamics into farmers’ input use decision
making. Deliberately using low levels of inputs to take
advantage of crop insurance (i.e., moral hazard) will
reduce APH for the next 10 years. Consequently, the
dynamics help alleviate the moral hazard problem.
Importantly, the crop insurance program design includes more complex rules that can modify APH, and
we examine yield adjustment1.
In the case of unexpected catastrophic yield-damaging
events (e.g., drought, hail, flood), a producer can elect
to substitute 60% of a county’s T-yield for his yield in
the APH calculation with yield adjustment (YA). A
______________
We also examine trend adjustment in the full article. Results can
be found in the full article.
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County’s T-yield value is based on the historical average
yield. For example, the T-yield for irrigated corn in 2018 for
Chase County, Nebraska, was 185 bushels per acre. Consider someone who has produced 200 bushels per acre for the
past nine years. If hail wipes out his crop (no yield), the
yield is zero in the tenth year. Without YA, his APH would
be 180 (calculated as [200×9+0×1]/10). With YA, he can
substitute 60% of the county T-yield (0.6×185 = 111) for the
zero, which results in an APH of 191 (calculated as
[200×9+111]/10). We examine various levels of YA to understand the potential impact on irrigation usage.
Modeling Approach: Our analysis used USDA-RMA actuary parameters for Chase County, Nebraska for the 2017
production season. Chase County is in southwestern Nebraska in the Republican River Basin. Irrigation in the region is primarily from the Ogallala Aquifer. While concerns
about the long-term sustainability of groundwater use
throughout the Ogallala Aquifer are significant, this region
also has short-term needs to limit groundwater use.
Estimating the impact of crop insurance on farmer’s wateruse decisions requires understanding the response of crop
yields to irrigation inputs, and how this response varies under different growing season weather conditions. We estimated the crop-water production function for corn in Chase
County using AquaCrop-OS. AquaCrop-OS is a free, opensource version of AquaCrop, a crop water productivity
model developed by the Food and Agriculture Organization
of the United Nations (Foster et al., 2017). AquaCrop-OS
relates crop yield and total seasonal applied water to a soil
moisture target and weather conditions. Our approach allowed the soil moisture target to vary intra-seasonally by
crop growth stage, reflecting differing crop sensitivity to
water stress throughout the season. All simulations used
crop parameters that have previously been calibrated for
typical corn hybrids grown in the U.S. and assume that irrigation is applied using a center-pivot irrigation system (the
common technology used in the study region) with an application efficiency of 90%. Figure 1 shows the distribution
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Figure 1: Generated Distribution of Yield
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of generated yields. We created a representative sample
of weather scenarios for our study region by using observed time-series data for the study area from a weather station in Champion, Nebraska.
We solve the dynamic optimization problem under
various combinations of irrigation costs and YA ratios.
Insurance costs are dynamically updated each year to
reflect yield history. We include irrigation costs of $6,
$10, $14, and $18 per acre-inch. We include YA ratios
of 0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6 (status quo), 0.8, and 1. A YA ratio of
0.4 means that a producer can substitute 40% of the
county T-yield for actual yield in the APH calculation.
A ratio of 0 is equivalent to not allowing any yield adjustment, and a ratio of 1 means that a producer can
fully substitute the county T-yield without penalty.
Results: Table 1 compares the average optimal irrigation use with and without insurance at the different
levels of irrigation cost and adjustment ratio. At lower
irrigation costs ($6 and $10), there is no incentive for
moral hazard at any YA ratio. For costs of $14/acreinch and $18/acre-inch, increasing the adjustment ratio
from the status quo has a sizable impact on moral hazard incentives. Allowing full replacement (ratio = 1.0)
with the county T-yield reduces irrigation applied by
2.03 and 4.30 acre-inches relative to no insurance when
costs are $14 and $18 per acre-inch, respectively. This
is a net reduction of 0.93 (2.03−1.10 = 0.93) and 2.30
(4.30−2.00 = 2.30) acre-inches, relative to the status
quo. In contrast, lowering the adjustment ratio has a
much smaller effect on applied irrigation. An adjustment ratio of 0.0 is equivalent to not allowing YA. Adjusting the crop insurance program to not allow YA is
expected to increase applied irrigation by 0.24 (10.38–
10.14) and 0.68 (8.9-8.22) at costs of $14 and $18, relative to the status quo, respectively.
Our results show that at high costs, there are substantial differences between the insured and non-insured
optimal irrigation application rates.
One possible explanation for this
result is the presence of a moral
hazard cycle, where periods of full
irrigation are followed by periods of
little or no irrigation (this was
found in previous work by Vercammen and van Kooten, 1994). If insurance rules that require the application of sufficient irrigation to
meet crop water requirements are
enforced, then it may not be practically possible for farmers to adopt
this approach. We test this by imposing a requirement that farmers
240
245 only choose soil moisture target
strategies with an expected level of

irrigation strategy is not feasible (i.e., the requirement
is enforced), the incentive for moral hazard is nearly
eliminated at all irrigation costs.

irrigation of at least 5 acre-inches. The results are in Table
2, which compares the expected level of irrigation based
on policy enforcement. Results show that when a zero-

Table 1: The Impact of Yield Adjustment on Optimal Irrigation
Mean Irrigation (inches)
Irrigation
Cost
6
10

14

18

Yield
Adjustment
Ratio

With
Insurance

No
Insurance

Difference

0.0 - 1.0
0.0 - 1.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8

12.51
11.44
10.38
10.33
10.25
10.14
9.79
9.21
8.9
8.84
8.69
8.22
7.58

12.50

0.01

11.44

0.00

1.0

5.92

-0.86
-0.91
-0.99

11.24

-1.10
-1.45
-2.03
-1.32
-1.38
-1.53

10.22

-2.00
-2.65
-4.31

Note: This table presents the mean optimal irrigation amount under various irrigation costs and
YA ratios. “With Insurance” and “No Insurance” columns present optimal irrigation with and
without crop insurance, respectively. “Difference” compares the two cases. All adjustment ratios
are estimated for $6 and $10 independently with identical results.

Table 2: The Impact of the Sufficient Irrigation Requirement on Optimal Irrigation
Mean Irrigation (inches)
Irrigation
Cost

Irrigation
Requirement
Enforced

With
Insurance

No
Insueance

Difference

6

Yes/No

12.51

12.50

0.01

10

Yes/No

11.44

11.44

0.00

Yes

11.08

No

10.14

Yes

10.23

No

8.22

14
18

11.24
10.22

Note: Results are based on the status quo yield adjustment ratio of 0.6.

-0.15
-1.10
0.01
-2.00

Discussion and Conclusion: Our results show that under
the current policy design and at current irrigation costs,
there is little incentive to adjust irrigation use due to crop
insurance. However, if both the YA ratio and the cost increase, that incentive increases significantly. These results
are driven almost entirely by a moral hazard cycle, where
producers switch between irrigation and no irrigation. Enforcement that eliminates the zero-irrigation option nearly
eliminates these effects. When enforcement is not fully feasible, policies to increase the cost of irrigation to reduce
water use (e.g., water tax) may inadvertently affect insurance incentives. In most cases, the policies shift water use in
the same direction. A higher water tax reduces irrigation
use directly via the tax, and indirectly via an insurance incentive. However, there are cases where the policies work in
opposite directions.
While the results provide important insight about crop insurance policy design, it is important to keep in mind that
the outcomes are based on simulations and not on empirical data. Our results are determined by an optimization
procedure that incorporates risk aversion but does not incorporate other behavioral factors. The results show that if
a producer chooses to do so, incentives to adjust irrigation
exist in certain cases but does not suggest that producers
are doing this in practice.
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